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The paper aims to analyze the problem of regulating a pollution-generating single product 
monopolistic firm in the presence of information asymmetry about the firm’s cost performance. 
Following Boyer and Laffont (1999), incentive-based optimal regulation of the firm’s price/ output 
and the environmental performance is characterized when costs are increasing in output and 
declining in pollution generated during production. Further, the regulatory agency/ legislator may or 
may not be politically motivated. When he/ she is politically inclined, the process of lobbying 
assumes that interest groups offer monetary contributions to the regulatory agency or the legislator. 
These contributions from the lobby help fund election campaigns. Thus, he/ she no longer behaves as 
a benevolent maximizer of social welfare, but instead maximizes a weighted average of social 
welfare and welfare of the lobby. Two alternative cases are considered: one, where the lobby 
represents environmental interests alone, and another, where the lobby stands solely for firm’s/ 
industry’s interests. The analysis derives interesting implications for incentive-based regulation of 
the firm. In general, pricing and environmental performance are distorted for the inefficient firm type 
under asymmetric information to restrict rents accruing to the efficient firm type. In the presence of 
the environmental lobby, the politically inclined regulator imposes more stringent environmental 
regulation under both full information and incomplete information as compared to the no-lobbying 
case. Interestingly, lobbying by the firm/ industry group also induces the politically motivated 
regulator to have more restrictive environmental regulation, albeit it now combines it with a higher 
regulated output for the inefficient firm type under incomplete information vis-à-vis the case of no-
lobbying activity. 
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  11. Introduction 
This paper focuses on the problem of incentive-based optimal regulation of pricing/ output and 
environmental pollution of a polluting single-product monopolistic firm whose cost parameters are 
not known to the regulator/ legislator. In a regulatory setting, it is plausible to assume that the firm 
has more information about its cost function, production capabilities and pollution abatement 
opportunities (or effort toward abatement) than does the regulator. In this paper, we consider the case 
where firm’s costs could be low either due to more efficient technology (firm-type) or due to higher 
emissions (lower abatement effort). While the regulator can observe costs, he cannot ascribe cost 
performance to firm’s technology type or the level of abatement activity. The optimal regulatory 
contract specifies output (or price) as well as the allowable pollution level of the monopolistic firm. 
Further, the analysis is extended to examine whether and how the optimal regulation gets altered in 
the presence of lobbying by interest groups when the regulator/ legislator is no longer a pure social 
welfare maximizer. In this case, the regulator/ legislator is influenced by lobbies that operate political 
contributions to it in return for more favorable regulatory outcomes. Two alternative cases of 
lobbying are considered: one, where the interest group reflects environmental interest alone and, 
another, where the firm/ industry lobby is influential for the regulatory process. The 
environmentalists lobby may prefer a lower level of regulated output and more stringent 
environmental regulation, while the firm lobby would tend to benefit from a lax environmental 
regulation and lower output/ higher price. Since the politically inclined regulator would strive to 
trade-off gains in social welfare (due to a more stringent pollution policy) against loss in rent to the 
efficient firm as well as loss in rent of the lobby (that would lower his/ her political support) it is not 
clear a priori as to the how lobbying activity would distort the optimal regulatory contract as 
compared to the case when the regulator is a pure social welfare maximizer. 
 
The emerging regulatory literature has assigned considerable importance to the concerns of 
asymmetric information, and has utilized a principal-agent framework for the analytical treatment of 
this issue. For example, Loeb and Magat (1979), Baron and Myerson (1982), Sappington (1983), 
Guesnerie and Laffont (1984), Maskin and Riley (1984), Riordan (1984), Lewis and Sappington 
(1988a, 1988b), Laffont and Tirole (1986, 1993), Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1995), Laffont and 
Martimort (2002), Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) all model the principal-agent relationships in the 
context of economic regulation where the principal is constrained by some private information 
possessed by the agent, such as that pertaining to the latter’s cost, demand, productivity parameter or 
effort toward cost reduction. Most of these papers derive that due to information asymmetry, the 
  2optimal pricing rule and/ or incentive schemes in these second-best situations are distorted as 
compared to the first-best situation of complete information.  
 
Further, principal-agent frameworks in regulatory literature have been extended to incorporate the 
concerns of environmental pollution. The application of incentive regulation to environment is 
appropriate as the regulator does not have complete information about the private benefits that the 
citizens enjoy if environmental quality is improved and/ or the costs that the firm bears for pollution 
abatement (see Lewis 1996). Spulber (1988) assumes that the costs of production and pollution 
abatement are interdependent and firms (operating in a competitive environment) have private 
information on their costs. The regulatory game involves firms that pursue Bayesian-Nash strategies 
in communicating with the regulator. The regulatory mechanism specifies both effluent charges and 
effluent levels for each firm as a function of the cost parameters of all other firms. The trade-off 
between the benefits of pollution abatement and the benefits from the production of increased market 
output (and hence higher consumer welfare) is characterized under alternative situations of the 
budget constraint of the regulator to be binding or not binding. In particular, it is derived that in case 
of the former, the regulatory mechanism is not individually rational, entailing lower aggregate output 
and effluent levels under asymmetric information as compared to the full information optimum. 
Assuming absence of a budget constraint, Lewis (1996) makes important contribution by utilizing 
incentive-based regulation to evaluate different policy instruments to deal with environmental 
problems. She shows that optimal mechanism to reduce the rents to the firm results in the loss of 
efficiency of pollution control. The degree of the regulatory intervention is lowered to limit the rents 
of the privately informed polluting firms. She considers the optimal regulation of an electric utility’s 
price and pollution. The cost of this firm is unknown to the regulator, although the latter knows the 
distribution of the unknown technological parameter. Two separate cases are considered – one, 
where the regulator can observe the level of emissions, and the other where he cannot, since it is 
costly to do so. It is shown that the amount of output and pollution abatement may be distorted below 
the efficient level to reduce the rents accruing to the more efficient utility. Boyer and Laffont (1999) 
also model the regulation of a polluting monopolist firm, which has private knowledge about the cost 
of realising a public project, and the budget constraint is non-binding. Their results are along the 
lines of Lewis (1996), where they show that the firm enjoys a rent as it possesses superior 
information, and the optimal choice of the environmental policy affects this rent. They derive the 
first- and second-best environmental policy that maximizes social welfare. In the latter case, the 
regulatory mechanism distorts the level of environmental pollution of the inefficient firm type 
upward to lower the rent accrual to the more efficient firm type. Lewis and Sappington (1995) follow 
  3another line of enquiry. They consider the case where a firm can reduce pollution by restricting its 
output, however, the capacity to do so differs across firms. They find that it is preferable to regulate 
output rather than regulating emissions, where the marginal loss in output due to lowering emissions 
decreases in the level of production. By doing so, the regulator can limit the firm’s ability to 
overstate its cost of foregoing the level of production in terms of lower emissions more effectively 
than the direct regulation of emissions, as explained by Lewis (1996). 
 
In our paper, we extend the analysis of Spulber (1988) and Boyer and Laffont (1999) to consider 
regulation of production of a private and differentiated good by a single-product polluting 
monopolist firm. Unlike Spulber (1988), where each firm takes the market price as given (as the 
product market is assumed to be competitive), the regulator in our model attempts to control both, 
output (or price) and the effluent level, of the firm. Moreover, the regulatory mechanism considered 
here entails no budget balance and the transfers to the firm are funded by distortionary taxes on 
consumers. Furthermore, our paper differs from Boyer and Laffont (1999) in that instead of a fixed-
size public project considered by them, we assume the firm’s output to be variable in size. This 
allows us to characterize optimal regulation of both the price/ output and the environmental 
performance of the firm. 
 
In addition, to a large extent the above strand of regulatory literature derives optimal regulation in 
the context of the regulator being benevolent. Boyer and Laffont (1999) is an exception, as their 
analysis incorporates the role of regulatory capture by the interest groups.  If the regulator is assumed 
to be influenced by special-interest politics, the effect of lobbying on the objective function of the 
regulator, and hence the implications for the equilibrium regulatory outcomes, needs to be explicitly 
analyzed. Specifically, Boyer and Laffont (1999) characterize politics by extending their basic model 
to incorporate the role of regulatory capture by two types of interest groups, represented by 
stakeholders in the firm and environmentalists respectively. They model the election mechanism 
explicitly and assume that the environmental policy is delegated to the political majorities pursuing 
their private agendas. These majorities have different stakes in the information rent of the interest 
groups and thus favors the groups with which their political interests are aligned. They show that 
competition between interest groups raises the stakes of political conflict, generating additional 
distortions and transforms desirable reforms toward delegated incentive mechanism into undesirable 
reforms. It is shown that different lobby groups may benefit from the capture of the regulator/ 
government through the size of the information rents that the regulatory mechanism provides due to 
information asymmetry. For our analysis, we adopt another modeling approach for incorporating 
  4lobby behavior as pioneered by Grossman and Helpman (1994). Grossman and Helpman (1994) 
analyze the behavior of an incumbent government, which is not a benevolent maximizer of social 
welfare. It is influenced by multiple lobby groups and maximizes a weighted average of pure social 
welfare and welfare of the lobbies. The lobbies can potentially influence the policy stand of the 
government by operating campaign contributions that help it win the elections. These contributions 
induce the government regulator to distort policies in favor of the lobbies. Fredriksson (1997, 1998), 
Aidt (1998), Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998), Schleich (1999), Damania (2001) and Fredriksson 
et al. (2005) model similar lobbying behavior (in the context of a single lobby or multiple lobbies) to 
identify optimal pricing and environmental policy. While these papers utilize full information 
models, we attempt to characterize optimal regulation under asymmetry of information between the 
regulator and the firm. 
 
Our paper departs from the line of enquiry of Boyer and Laffont (1999) by focusing explicitly on the 
implication of this lobbying behavior on the optimal regulatory contract emerging in the equilibrium 
vis-à-vis the benchmark case of no lobbying, and sidesteps the modeling of the election mechanism 
itself. Further, we consider the effect of one lobby at a time (first, by characterizing the influence of a 
group that has no stake in the production process but is concerned only about the pollution from 
production and second, the monopoly firm itself) unlike Boyer and Laffont (1999), who study the 
effect of competition between these two lobbies in the face of an election process. The effect of 
politically influential sectors (viz. agriculture) on socially optimal environmental regulation under 
asymmetric information is also examined by Sheriff (2008). His analysis, however, focuses on the 
choice of optimal regulatory instruments given both -- informational and political -- constraints.  
 
Given the policy tool-kit comprising regulation of firm’s price (or output) and allowable emissions, 
and provision for government transfers/ subsidies, the key purpose of our paper is to examine how 
the regulator, maximizing his political support rather than pure social welfare, distorts the optimal 
regulatory contract. The major findings of the paper are as follows:   
1.  In the basic model (with no-lobbying activity), both the pricing rule and environmental pollution 
at the equilibrium are affected by information asymmetry. Further, given the cost-structure, 
pricing-incentive dichotomy does not hold. That is, incentive concerns are taken care of by using 
both – the pricing and cost reimbursement rules, induced by incomplete information between the 
regulator and the firm. Specifically, while the efficient firm’s optimal pollution and output is 
unaffected by information asymmetry, inefficient firm’s pollution is distorted upward and its 
output is altered downward for rent extraction purposes. 
  52.  With lobbying by the environmental group, all the results as in (1) hold. Additionally, a relatively 
greater weight on the contributions made by the lobby to the regulator, in comparison with pure 
social welfare, induces the regulator to lower the optimal level of pollution (or adopt more 
stringent environmental regulation) vis-à-vis the case of no-lobbying. This result holds under 
both full information and asymmetric information. However, lobbying activity (alone) here has 
no bearing on the pricing rules or output, with or without full information. 
3.  With lobbying by the firm/ industry group, the incentive concerns are again taken care of by 
adjusting both the regulated price and the cost-reimbursement rule i.e. this part of the result in (1) 
holds. Under asymmetric information, the lobbying activity does not affect the optimal behavior 
of the efficient-firm type compared to the no-lobby case. But it affects the inefficient type’s 
behavior where, interestingly, the politically inclined regulator restricts the optimal level of 
pollution and allows for a lower price-cost margin (implying higher regulated output) vis-à-vis 
the basic case involving no lobbying activity. The rent-seeking regulator may also leave a 
positive rent to both the firm-types.  
      
The remaining paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the baseline model of incentive-based 
pricing and environmental regulation is postulated and examined. Here, the regulator acts as a 
benevolent social welfare maximizer. Next, the analysis is extended to the case where the regulator is 
politically motivated, and maximizes a weighted sum of private gains and societal welfare. The 
influence of lobbying by an environmental group is characterized in section 3 and that of the firm/ 
industry lobby in section 4. In both the cases, we identify the optimal regulatory response of the 
corruptible regulator. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Basic Model of Environmental and Pricing Regulation of a Single Product 
Polluting Firm 
We consider a monopolistic firm, which produces a differentiated private good with cost function, 
(,,) Cd q β , whereβ  is the cost characteristic or the efficiency parameter,   is the level of pollution 
exerted by the firm’s production activity and   denotes the level of output. For a given pollution 
level and output, 
d
q
β  measures the efficiency of the firm: a higherβ  implies higher cost or inefficient-
firm type. It is assumed thatβ  is privately known to the firm.  
 
The cost function takes the form, () CK d q β = − , which is similar to Boyer and Laffont (1999). C  is 
the total cost and, for a givenβ  and  , we assume that allowing more pollution reduces the cost of  q
  6the firm. As already stated, for a given d  and  , C  is increasing in q β  ( ), and  0 Cβ > 0 d Cβ < , 
implying a positive correlation between the ability to produce and ability to reduce pollution. β  can 
take two discrete values { } , β β  with β β > .   is a constant. Let  K β ββ Δ =−.   is the 
marginal cost or the average cost. For a given
( cK d β ≡− )
β ,  is decreasing in . Moreover,   and 
. 
c d 0 cβ >
0 d cβ <
 
The regulator compensates the firm through a transfer. Let t denote the net monetary transfer from 
the regulator to the firm. Accordingly, the firm’s rent is equal to 
  () Ut Kd q β =− − .           
We normalize the firm’s outside opportunity level of utility or “reservation utility” to zero. 
Accordingly, the individual rationality or the participation constraint of the firm will be: 
    .            0 U ≥ () 0 tK d q β ⇒− − ≥
Let the good be sold at the (linear) price p . The gross consumer surplus is . We take a general 
downward sloping demand function 
() Sq
( ) qQ p =  which is invertible, with the inverse demand function 
, as  . The firm’s revenue is  () pP q = () Sq ′ = q d q P q S
q
~   ) ~ ( ) (
0 ∫ = ( ) ( ) R qP q q = ⋅ . The aggregate 
social surplus  , is the sum of the net consumers’ surplus plus the revenue for the regulator 




λ , because revenues help the regulator cover the firm’s cost and reduce the need 
for distortionary taxation to operate transfers to the firm. Thus, 
  () () () ( ) ( ) 1 Vq Sq Rq Rq λ =−+ + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦   ( ) ( ) Sq Rq λ =+   ( ) ( ) Sq Pq q λ = +⋅ , 
where  ( ) 00 V = ,  ( ) 0 Vq ′ >  and  ( ) 0 Vq ′′ < . That is,  ( ) V ⋅  is concave. Given a downward sloping 
demand curve, a sufficient condition for  ( ) V ⋅  to be concave is that either  ( ) P ⋅ be concave or that λ  
be small enough.
3 The social disutility or damage from pollution is given by the damage 
function ( ) Dd, with   and  () 0 Dd ′ > ( ) 0 Dd ′′ > .  
 
The accounting convention is that the regulator collects the revenue from the sales of output and 
makes the lump sum transfer   to the firm, a part of which are raised through taxation assumed to be  t
                                                 
3 This formulation follows the one in Laffont and Tirole (1993). 
  7distortionary. This inflicts a disutility of ( ) 1 t λ + on the consumers/taxpayers. The social damage 
from pollution affects all the consumers equally. That is, the environmental damage is perfectly 
mixed. The net welfare for the consumers is given by  
  () ()( ) 1 CS V q D d t λ =−− + .           
We assume that  is large enough so that the production of the good is always desirable from 
welfare perspective.  
() Vq
 
In addition, the following implicit assumptions underlie the analysis in this section. First, both the 
regulator and the firm adopt an optimizing behavior and maximize their individual welfare/ utilities: 
the regulator maximizes pure social welfare and the firm maximises its private rent. Thus, all the 
agents are rational. Second, while the regulator does not know the firm’s type, it has a prior on or 
knowledge of the probability distribution of this information, which is also common knowledge. 
Third, under full information, the regulator maximizes the sum of the net consumers’ welfare and the 
rent of the firm, and under incomplete information, it maximizes the expected value of the same. 
That is, the regulator follows Bayesian-Nash regulatory strategies. Accordingly, in case of 
asymmetric information, the regulator moves first (as a Stackelberg leader) anticipating the firm’s 
behavior and specifies a menu of the regulatory contracts. The firm then makes the announcement 
about its type, the contract is awarded and the firm undertakes production and receives transfers from 
the regulator. This completes the description of the model. In what follows we characterize the 
regulatory outcome under full information for the baseline model.  
 
2.1 Full Information 
Under full information, the regulator knows the type of the firm i.e. he knows the value of β , and 
hence, all the components of the cost function. He maximizes social welfare, given by  
    WC S U =+
        .          () ()( ) 1 Vq Dd t U λ =−− + +
Substituting for t, this could be expressed as 
  () ()( ) ( ) { } 1 WV q D d Kd q U λ βλ =−− + −− .        (1)          
Note that in equation (1), the cost of production is evaluated at the shadow price of public funds as 
by assumption, non-distortionary taxes are absent. The regulator’s optimization problem can be 
written as 
  8  ( )( ) () ( ) { } Max 1
,,
WV q D d Kd q U
dqU
λ βλ =−− + −−
.    
The first-order conditions are: 
  ( ) ( ) 1 Dd q λ β ′ =+ ,          ( 2 )  
  ,         ( 3 )   () ( ) ( ) 1 Vq Kd λβ ′ =+ −
  .            ( 4 )   0 U =
We assume that the second-order conditions, which are: ( ) 0 Dd ′′ − < ,   and  
, hold.
() 0 Vq ′′ <
() ()( )
2 2 10 Dd Vq λβ ′′ ′′ ++ <
4
Equation (2) implies that the regulator sets the optimum pollution at a level where marginal disutility 
or damage from pollution is equal to its marginal benefit in terms of marginal production cost 
savings, evaluated at the shadow price of public funds. Equation (3) characterizes the optimum 
regulated price. According to this equation, the marginal social surplus is equated to the marginal 
cost of production, again evaluated at the shadow price of public funds.  
 
Differentiating  yields the expression for marginal social surplus as   () Vq
  () () () ( ) Vq Sq Pqq P q λλ ′′ ′ =+ ⋅ + .        ( 5 )    
Substituting (5) into (3) implies () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 Sq Pqq P q Kd λλ λ β ′′ + ⋅+ = + − , as  ( ) ( ) pP q S q ′ == 


















η =− , is the elasticity of demand. Equation (6) is called the Lerner index, which in 
this case will be a number between 0 and 1 times the inverse of the elasticity of demand. It implies 






≡ , for a large value of λ ) as λ  is positive and small. It also yields a Ramsey pricing rule 
where the regulator leaves a positive price-cost margin that depends on the shadow price of public 
funds. Although the firm does not balance its budget, the positive price-cost margin implies that it is 
met implicitly. If we denote the equilibrium solution yielded by equations (2) and (3) by  ( )
* qc  and 
                                                 
4 These three conditions follow from the Hessian being negative semi-definite, implying V”<0, D”>0 and 
both sufficiently large. 
  9the corresponding price by ( ) ( ) ( )
** p cP q c = , these will be called the Ramsey output and price, 
respectively. Lastly, equation (4) implies that the regulator leaves no rent to the firm. The intuition 
being, with positive shadow price of public funds, rent is socially costly. Since the transfer to the 
firm is financed out of distortionary taxes, the regulator pushes it down to zero. These results 
conform to the standard results in the regulation of a monopoly firm (see Laffont and Tirole, 1993, 
pp 133-4). 
 
2.2 Asymmetric Information 
Under asymmetry of information, while the regulator does not know the specific type of the firm, he 
is assumed to have knowledge of the probability distribution of the parameterβ . He has prior 
knowledge of the value of this efficiency parameter characterized by ( Pr ) ν ββ == . Given our 
assumption on  being large, the regulator will want both the type of firms to participate. He/ she 
observes the realised cost C  and makes a transfer to the firm. The regulator wants the firm to reveal 
its true type. Hence the incentive compatibility (IC) condition is imposed, which is tantamount to 
truth-telling by the firm. It implies that the firm has no incentive to misreport its true type as it enjoys 
a rent which is at least as high as it would have enjoyed by pretending to be the other type. Thus, the 
contract preferred by the efficient type 
() Vq
β  (respectively typeβ ) is the one designed for the efficient 
type β  (respectively type β ). Let  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Ut K d q β ββ β β =−−  denote the rent for the type β  
when it selects the contract designed for it. For notational simplicity, we use  () tt β = ,  ( ) dd β = , 
( ) qq β = for the efficient type and similar notations for the inefficient type. Then, the IC constraints 
for the two types are: 
   () () tK d q tK d ββ −− ≥ −− q , for the β -type,  and   (7) 
  () () tK d q tK d ββ −− ≥ −− q  for the β -type.     (8) 
Next, the individual rationality (IR) constraints imply that the firm will participate irrespective of its 
type. We write the two IR constraints as  
  () 0 Ut Kd q β =− − ≥,         ( 9 )  
  () 0 Ut Kd q β =− − ≥.         ( 1 0 )  
In view of  , C U t + =  and  C U t + = , the regulator, in this case, maximizes the expected social 
welfare 
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() ()( ) () { }
() () ()() () {}
1
, , , , ,         1 1
EW V q D d K d q U
ddqqUU Vq Dd K dq U
νλ β λ
νλ β
⎡⎤ =− − + − − ⎣⎦
λ ⎡ ⎤ +− − −+ − −
⎣ ⎦
, (11) 
subject to (7), (8), (9) and (10). 
 
Satisfying the IC for the efficient type and IR for the inefficient type will imply that IR for the 
efficient type is met. Since  () β ββ Δ≡−  is positive, we use (7) and (10) successively into (9) to 
show that 
  ()()( ) ( ) 0 U t K dq K dq K dq K dq βββ β ≥− − ≥ − − − = Δ − ≥. 
Thus (9) is automatically satisfied and we can ignore this constraint. This is because the efficient 
type can always pretend to be the inefficient type at a lower cost (due to its better technology type). 
We can write the IC constraint for the efficient type as 
   () ( ) Ut Kd qU Kd q ββ ≥− − = + Δ − ,       ( 1 2 )  
which implies that the rent of the  − β type firm is increasing in the output and declining in the level 
of pollution of the  − β type firm. 
 
The efficient type can always mimic to be the inefficient type by choosing the pollution level, 
transfer and output of the latter and produce at a cost ( ) Kd q β − , which will enable it to enjoy a 
profit or rent of at least () Kd q β Δ− . As is evident from the inequality in (12), when the efficient 
type acts according to its true type, it will receive at least  ( ) Kd q β Δ−  of positive rent even when 
the inefficient type’s rent is fully extracted. Since transfers are distortionary, the rents that accrue to 
the firm are socially costly. The IC constraint for the efficient type and the IR constraint for the 
inefficient type would thus bind at the optimum. This leaves us with the reduced form of 
maximization of the social welfare subject to the constraints (10) and (12),
5 both of which will hold 
with strict equality at the optimum. Therefore, we substitute  ( ) UK d β =Δ − q  and  0 U =  into (11) 
and rewrite the regulator’s objective function as 
                                                 
5 We can ignore the IC constraint for the inefficient type (inequality in equation (8)) for the moment and 
show that it will be satisfied with the solution of the maximization with the binding IC for the efficient type. 
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() ()( ) () { } ( )
{} () () ()() () {}
Max 1
, , , ,         1 1
EWV q D d K d q K d q
ddqq Vq Dd K dq
νλ β λ β
νλ β
⎡ ⎤ =− − + − − Δ − ⎣ ⎦
⎡⎤ +− − −+ −
⎣⎦
. 
The solution is characterized by the following four first-order conditions 
  () ( ) 1 Dd q λ β ′ =+ ⋅ ,          ( 1 3 )  






′ =+ ⋅ + Δ
−
β ,        ( 1 4 )  
  () () ( 1 Vq Kd λβ ′ =+ − ) ,         ( 1 5 )  
  () () () ( 1
1




′ =+ − + Δ −
−
.      ( 1 6 )  
We provide our observations in terms of the following propositions: 
 
Proposition 1. At the asymmetric information equilibrium, the optimal level of pollution for the 
inefficient firm type is higher than that of the efficient type. The inefficient firm also sells a smaller 
output than the efficient firm. That is,  , d d <  and  , q q >  or   and  0 ) ( > β d & . 0 ) ( < β q &  
 
Proof.  The above equilibrium conditions in (13)-(16) can be expressed in terms of the parameterβ  
as follows: 




λ βλ β β
ν
′ =+ + −
−
,        






′ =+ − + − −
−
, 
such that as  , β β =  the above two equations collapse to equations (13) and (15) respectively, and at 
, β β =  these are as in (14) and (16). The rankings of optimal pollution, output and costs for the two 
types are derived by doing comparative statics with respect to this parameter.
6 It is found that with 
the social value function  sufficiently concave and the pollution damage function 
sufficiently convex, optimal pollution is increasing in
) (q V
) (d D β  and optimal output is decreasing 
inβ .
7 However, costs are not monotonic inβ . The cost for the inefficient type may be higher or 
lower than for the efficient type depending on the parameteric configuration of the cost function. 
Since the positive rent for the efficient type decreases in the pollution level of the inefficient type, 
                                                 
6 See appendix A for the detailed mathematical proof. 
7 We require  and   and their absolute magnitude to be sufficiently large for the second-order 
conditions to hold.  
0 < ′ ′ V 0 > ′ ′ D
  12optimal regulation suggests a higher pollution level for the latter so that the rent to the former can be 
lowered. On the other hand, the rent for the efficient type is an increasing function of the output of 
the inefficient type. So, the regulator induces a lower equilibrium output for the latter by allowing a 
higher price-cost margin for it.
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Further, we find that  
 
Proposition 2. For the inefficient firm, the optimal pricing rule (as characterized by (16)) and the 
level of environmental pollution (determined by (14)) are both affected by information asymmetry. 
For the  − β type firm, the choice of the optimal pollution and output are distorted upward and 
downward respectively under asymmetric information. The behavior of the efficient type, however, 
is not affected by information asymmetry. 
 
Proof. Similar to the line of the proof of Proposition 1, we can now characterize the move from full 
information to asymmetric information equilibrium for the  − β type firm by expressing the first-
order conditions as follows: 




λ βλ ξ β
ν
′ =+ + −
−
β  
  () ( 1 )( ) ( ) ( ) .
1
V q Kd Kd
ν
λβ λ ξβ β
ν
′ =+ − + − −
−
  
Note that for , 0   and   = = ξ β β the above two represent the full information equilibrium conditions (2) 
and (3) respectively, and as  , 1 = ξ  these collapse into (14) and (16), which are the first-order 
conditions at the asymmetric information equilibrium. Thus, carrying out the comparative statics 
with respect toξ  provides an indication of the change in the allowable pollution and output due to a 
discrete move from full information to asymmetric information equilibrium. It is derived that for the 
inefficient firm-type, the regulated pollution is raised and output is lowered at the asymmetric 
information equilibrium as compared to that at the full information equilibrium. This holds since 
and   and their absolute magnitudes are assumed to be large enough. 0 < ′ ′ V 0 > ′ ′ D
9 Intuitively, as the 
rent accruing to the efficient type is increasing in the level of output and decreasing in the level of 
pollution of the inefficient type, the regulator responds by distorting the latter’s pollution level 
upward and regulated output downward. Thus, the inefficient type’s optimal pollution and sale of 
                                                 
8 A higher price-cost margin implying a lower level of sales of output directly follows from the inverse 
demand function. 
9 See Appendix B for a detailed proof. 
  13output are distorted upward and downward respectively to reduce the rent accruing to the efficient 
type under asymmetric information. The contractual rules governing the optimal price and 
environmental pollution for the efficient firm-type remain the same as under full information (see the 
qualitative similarity between equations (13) and (2) and between equations (15) and (3)). 
 
With the optimal solutions as in equations (13)-(16), it is easy to check that the regulatory contract is 
incentive compatible for the inefficient type, as the IC for the efficient type binds. Expressing (8) as 
() () Ut Kd qU Kd q ββ ≥− − = − Δ −  and substituting (12) with equality on the right hand side, we 
get the condition 
  () () 0 Kd q Kd q β ⎡ ≥Δ − − − ⎣
⎤
⎦ .        ( 1 7 )  
This is satisfied at the optimum as dd < , qq >  (from Proposition 1) and  β Δ  is positive.  
 
The baseline model is now extended to include lobbying activity by a group of people in society who 
care for the environmental externality arising due to the production activity of the monopoly firm. 
The lobby has no stake either in the consumption of the polluting commodity or in the production 
activity of the firm. This helps us abstract away from the effects of lobbying on the consumer surplus 
and producer surplus, and derives more stark conclusions.
10 The regulator/ legislator receives 
campaign contributions from this environmental lobby and contributions are used to sway the voters 
in his favor in an unmodeled election process. 
 
3. Regulation in the Presence of Political Pressure by an Environmental Lobby 
Group 
It is now assumed that from the existing population, one group overcomes the free rider problem of 
collective action and coordinates its activities to form the environmental lobby. As Aidt (1998) 
argues in his paper, the implicit assumption is that these people might face lower organizational cost 
than others to justify how they are able to coordinate perfectly while others do not. Following Aidt 
(1998) and Boyer and Laffont (1999), we model this as a functionally specialized lobby, driven only 
by their environmental interest and having no stake in consumption or in the polluting firm. It is the 
consumers who pay the tax to enable transfers by the regulator. We call them consumer-taxpayers (as 
in Boyer and Laffont (1999)) to distinguish them from those members of the population who 
                                                 
10 Other papers such as Aidt (1998) and Boyer and Laffont (1999) also assume this. They, however, model 
the competition amongst the lobby groups in a regulatory setting, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
  14constitute the environmental lobby. The consumers are the free riders, as concerns about 
environmental pollution are addressed entirely by the activity of the self-interested environmental 
lobby. The net welfare for the taxpayers is the social surplus generated by the production process 
minus the tax that the regulator collects from them. Since taxation is distortionary, we write the net 
welfare of taxpayers as: 
  ()( ) 1 1 UV q t λ =− + .           
The environmental lobby suffers disutility from pollution. As earlier, we take the environmental 
damage function to be , with  () DD d = 0 D′ > ,  0 D′′ > . The lobby operates monetary contributions 
to the regulator to influence him to protect its interest. As in Boyer and Laffont (1999), we assume 
that the contributions offered by the lobby are a fixed proportion of the rent accruing to them and, for 
tractability; it is assumed that the contributions are non-distortionary. Denoting the rent for the lobby 
as  , their contribution or offer is given by  2 U 2 oU μ = , where μ  is exogenous. Let the lobby have a 
fixed endowment E  (or income from an exogenous source). The rent for it will then be equal to 
  ( )
2 UE D d =− − o .           
We assume that this fixed endowment or exogenous income of the lobby is large enough for its 
members to operate the contributions/ bribe to the regulator. Substituting for  , we can express 
the lobby rent as 
() o ⋅





=− ⎡ ⎣ +
d ⎤ ⎦ .            





=− ⎡ ⎣ +
⎤ ⎦ , will be 
decreasing in pollution. This implication is compatible with our assumption that the lobby offers a 
fixed proportion of their rent, which declines as the pollution increases.  
 
3.1 Full Information 
As in Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) we assume that the regulator’s/ legislator’s objective is to 
maximize a weighted sum of social welfare (sum of the net welfare of the consumers/ taxpayers, the 
lobby and the net rent for the firm) and contributions from the lobby. Thus, he/ she maximizes 
   ( ) 1 Wo α α Ω= + − ,            ( 1 8 )  
where     12 WUU U =++




Vq E Dd tU λ
μ
=+ − − + + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ +
, where U  is the firm’s rent as defined in the 
basic model and   are political contributions as defined earlier in this section. The parameters  () . o α  
and () 1 α −  in (18) denote the weights that the regulator assigns to social welfare and contributions 
received by him, respectively. We normalize the objective function and express it 
as Wa o
α






=  is the relative weight assigned to the contributions. A higher 
level of   implies that the regulator is more politically inclined. Substituting for W  and  a 2 oU μ = , 
we can write 









+ ′ Ω= + − − + + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ +
.       
From our basic model, substitution for   gives the final expression for the objective function as   t










+ ′ Ω= + − − + − − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ +
.  (19) 
The regulator maximizes the above objective function subject to the constraint that the firm 
participates ( ). Thus, his/ her problem becomes  0 U ≥











+ ′ Ω= + − − + − − ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ + . 
The first-order conditions are given by the following three equations: 










,         ( 2 0 )  
  ,         ( 2 1 )     () ( ) ( ) 1 Vq Kd λβ ′ =+ −
 0 .            ( 2 2 )   U =













+ ⎡ ⎤ ′′ −+ ⎢ ⎥ + ⎢ ⎥
′′ + ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
 be negative 
semidefinite. 
 
It is straightforward to see that equations (21) and (22) are analogs of equations (3) and (4) 
respectively in the basic model with no lobbying. Thus, the rule governing optimum pricing 
regulation is not affected due to politics. The only difference is that now the behavior of the regulator 
incorporates his valuation of the environmental lobby’s contribution to him/ her and this is captured 
  16in equation (20), signifying the extent of adjustment in environmental regulation. This is stated in 
terms of the next proposition.     
 
Proposition 3. If the regulator assigns a relatively greater weight to contributions from the lobby 
compared to the weight on pure social welfare, that is,  (which is the most plausible assumption 
for an electorally motivated regulator) then, under full information, both the pollution and output 
specified by the regulation mechanism are smaller in the presence of the environmental lobby vis-à-
vis the situation of no-lobbying. 
1 > a
 
Proof. Notably, an equal weight on both – pure social welfare and lobby contributions -- would yield 
the optimal level of pollution and output exactly equal to that in no-lobby case. That is, for  1 a = , the 
right hand side of (20) is equal to that of (2). However, for our case, we have 1 α α −>, implying 
. Thus, equilibrium pollution and output (with lobbying) yielded by simultaneously solving 
equations (20) and (21) can be compared with the corresponding solutions with no-lobbying (as 
derived by solving equations (2) and (3)) by doing comparative statics with respect to the parameter 
 It is derived that equilibrium pollution is declining in   that is, 
1 a >
. a , a , 0 < da dd while, from (21) it is 
easy to check that, given   the equilibrium output is increasing in pollution, or  , 0 < ′ ′ V . 0 > dd dq
11 
Thus, lobbying lowers the equilibrium pollution (as also the regulated output) as compared to no-
lobbying. The intuition is that the regulator, driven by the motivation to maximize a weighted sum of 
social welfare and the welfare of the environmental interest group, will be induced to adopt more 
stringent environmental regulation when the relative weight assigned to the latter is higher. This is 
because he/ she can then pocket a larger amount of contributions from the lobby. Since contributions 
are decreasing in pollution, the regulator lowers the optimal pollution to induce higher contributions. 
The output reduces as marginal costs increase due to lower pollution, and the regulator now trades-
off higher costs with benefits at the margin.  
 
3.2 Asymmetric Information 
In this case, the regulator does not know the firm type, but as before, he/ she is assumed to have the 
knowledge about the distribution of the unknown cost parameter of the firm,β . He/ she maximizes 
an expected sum of pure social welfare and political contributions offered by the environmental 
lobby. Since there is no change in the behavior of the firm, the IC and IR constraints will remain the 
same as in the baseline model. Thus, the regulator solves the following optimization problem: 
                                                 
11 Appendix C contains the mathematical proof. 
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λ
⎡ ⎤ +
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, 
subject to (7), (8), (9) and (10). 
 
Going by the same argument as provided before, the relevant constraints for the maximization 
problem will be the IC for the efficient type and the IR for the inefficient type, both of which will 
bind at the optimum. Substituting these two constraints with strict equality (as the regulatory agency 
dislikes leaving rent to each type) yields the regulator’s problem as 
 
() () {} () () {} ()
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+− + − −+ − ⎢⎥ + ⎣⎦
.  
The first order conditions are: 
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′ =⋅ + ⋅
+− +
Δ ,      ( 2 4 )  
  () () ( 1 Vq Kd λβ ′ =+ − ) ,         ( 2 5 )  
  () () () ( 1
1




′ =+ − + Δ −
−
.      ( 2 6 )  
It is easy to show that even at this political equilibrium (with asymmetric information) results similar 
to those in propositions 1 and 2 hold. This can be demonstrated by comparing the right hand sides in 
equations (23) and (24) with that in equation (20) and comparing the same in equations (25) and (26) 
with that in equation (21). Since, from the IC for the efficient type we have the rent of this type being 
negatively related to the level of allowable (regulated) pollution of the inefficient type, and rents are 
socially costly, the optimal response of the regulator is to distort the inefficient type’s pollution 
upward. On the other hand, the level of output of the inefficient type positively affects the rent of the 
efficient firm-type, and therefore, the optimal contract distorts the inefficient type’s output 
downward. However, the conditions characterizing the optimal level of pollution and pricing rule for 
the efficient type are not affected by information asymmetry.  
 
  18Proposition 4. The optimal pollution (output) for the inefficient type is higher (lower) than that of the 
efficient type. That is  ), (β d is increasing and  ), (β q  decreasing in the firm type, or,   and  0 ) ( > β d &
. 0 ) ( < β q &   
 
Proof. The method of proof is similar to that for the no-lobby case (see Proposition 1), which is 
provided in Appendix A.
12
 
Furthermore, in moving from no-lobbying to lobbying, the equilibrium rules governing the pricing/ 
output regulation for neither of the firm-type are affected. A comparison of (25) with (15) for the 
efficient type and (26) with (16) for the inefficient type show that, for both types, the equilibrium 
pricing equations are qualitatively the same. However, as will be shown later, this does not imply 
that the level of output or price is unchanged due to lobbying. However, the conditions 
characterizing the stringency of environmental regulation are influenced by lobbying for both the 
firm types. Hence, 
 
Proposition 5. As the regulator assigns a relatively large weight on the contributions compared to the 
pure social welfare, i.e. , the environmental lobby induces a lower level of equilibrium pollution 
for both the types vis-à-vis the case of no lobbying. Thus, the distortion in the inefficient type’s 
permissible level of pollution is smaller vis-à-vis the no-lobbying case. 
1 a >
 
Proof. This follows from the comparison of the equations (23) and (13) for the efficient type and (24) 
and (14) for the inefficient type. Comparative statics with respect to parameter  , along the line 
similar to that in Appendix C yield that both 
a
da d d and  da d d are negative in sign, implying a 
lowering of pollution of both the firm types due to lobbying by the environmental group. That 
0   and    0 > > d d q d d d q d follows from differentiating (25) and (26), and using    Given 
regulator’s political inclinations, adopting a more stringent environmental policy for both the types 
entails capturing higher monetary contributions from the environmental lobby. A more stringent 
environmental policy induces higher production costs for both the firm types, thus lowering their 
regulated output. 
. 0 < ′ ′ V
 
                                                 
12 See Appendix D, however, for the final expressions for  () d β & and  () q β & derived for this case.  
  19Further, since the rent-seeking behavior of the regulator from the environmental lobby tends to 
partially counter his/ her rent-reduction (accruing to the efficient firm-type) motivation, the regulator 
will distort the equilibrium allowable pollution of the inefficient type by a lower magnitude in the 
presence of the environmental lobby vis-à-vis the case of no lobbying. This is captured by the second 
term in the right hand side of equation (24), which is now smaller than its counterpart in equation 












. The efficient type, would therefore, 
derive a relatively higher rent in comparison with the baseline case of no-lobbying activity. Thus, at 
the margin, lower efficiency will be traded off against higher political contributions.  
 
In the next section we consider the case of political lobbying by the monopoly firm. The regulator/ 
legislator here receives the contributions from the firm while also regulating its activities. 
 
4. Regulation in the Presence of Political Pressure by the Industry Lobby Group 
Let the monopolistic firm now constitute the special-interest group or lobby. The lobby is assumed to 
be functionally specialized, in that, it cares only about its rent/ surplus. A priori the firm would tend 
to lobby for higher permissible pollution or lower output (that is, higher price) as both of these imply 
higher rent. The firm receives a net monetary transfer,t, from the regulator. But, it now returns to it 
political contributions that are related to the specific policy stance of the regulatory agency.  
 
Following Boyer and Laffont (1999), we assume that the firm-lobby offers a fixed proportion of its 
net rent as contributions to the regulator. (This is similar to the case in the last section where there 
was an environmental lobby.) Let these contributions be denoted by: 
  ˆ oU σ = , 
where U  is the rent accruing to the firm and σ  is the fixed proportion of the rent that the firm offers 
to the regulatory agency. We assume that σ  is exogenously given. Firm’s net rent can be expressed 
as 
  .  () ˆ Ut Kd q o β =− − −
Substituting for  , the above will be () ˆ . o ()
1
1
Ut K d β
σ
=− − q ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦ +
, implying that the contributions 
operated by the firm-lobby are increasing in the level of allowable pollution and declining in the 
level of output (since firm’s costs are declining in environmental pollution and increasing in output). 
Consequently, it earns a higher rent and its offers also increase as a fixed proportion of that rent. 
  20Assuming reservation utility to be zero, the IR or the participation constraint of the firm in this case 
will be  




tK d q β
σ
⇒− − ≥ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ +
.        
Unlike the previous section, we do not differentiate between the population of consumers and the 
environmental group. In this case, the firm-lobby is the only lobby that is modeled. Consequently, as 
regards the consumers, we are back to the basic case where the net welfare for the consumers is the 
social value of output,  minus the sum of disutilities they suffer on account of pollution and 
shadow value of tax paid to the regulator to enable transfers to the firm. Mathematically, it is 
expressed as 
), (q V
( )( ) () 1 CS V q D d t λ =−− + .  
 
4.1 Full Information 
In this case, the regulator maximizes a weighted sum of social welfare and contributions from the 
firm/ industry lobby. Social welfare is the consumers’ net welfare (including damage from 
environmental pollution) plus the rent of the firm. Denoting the weights that the regulator assigns to 
social welfare and to the contributions as α  and ( ) 1 α −  respectively, his/ her objective function will 
be 
  ( ) ˆ 1 Wo α α Ω= + − .           
In the next step, we normalize the objective function to express it as 
  ˆ Wa o
α
Ω ′ Ω= = + ,           






= . As earlier, a higher 
value of  implies a more politically inclined regulator. The social welfare will be  a
    WC S U =+ () ()( ) 1 Vq Dd t U λ = −− + + ,     
Substituting for W  from the above expression and with  ˆ oU σ =  in  ′ Ω , we get  
  () ()( ) 1 Vq Dd t U aU λ σ ′ Ω= − − + + + .             
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σ
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q ⎤ ⎦ , the regulator’s problem can be written as the following 
Lagrangean 
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tK d q λβ
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% = ⎤ ⎦ ,         ( 3 0 )  





tK d q β
σ
−−≥ ⎡ ⎣ +
⎤ ⎦ .         ( 3 2 )  
The last three conditions pertain to complementarity slackness. 
 
Two situations can emerge here. The first is when the Lagrangean multiplier takes a strictly positive 
value, that is,  . Then, the condition in equation (30) implies that the IR condition in (32) will 
hold with strict equality or it will bind. In other words, 
0 λ > %
0 U = . For  , the right hand side of (29) 
implies the parametric restriction 






+> . As we have earlier assumed λ  to be small enough, 
(a parametric restriction warranted by  ( ) V ⋅  to be concave), satisfying this inequality requires that σ  
be small enough, when  . Thus, even when the regulator assigns a relatively higher weight on 
political contributions as compared to pure social welfare (as 
1 a >
( ) 11 a α α >⇒ − > ), this condition 
entails that he/ she will still push the rent accruing to the firm to zero. This is because the latter offers 
a very small proportion of its rent to the regulator. In spite of being politically inclined, the regulator 
receives no contribution in this case since the firm is left with zero rent and the optimal level of 
contribution will be zero at the political equilibrium. 
 
The other case is that of the multiplier assuming a zero value. Condition (30) then implies that the IR 
constraint for the firm is not binding or U  will be positive. A politically inclined regulator here 
leaves a positive rent to the firm to maximize the contributions it receives. Hence, in this case, 
  22ˆ oU σ =  will be positive. Also, from (29), it requires that the right hand side would be equal to zero. 
Only if the value of the parameter   satisfies this condition, for a given  a λ  andσ , U  will be greater 
than zero. Thus, under full information, when the regulator receives contributions from the firm, 
positive rents are permitted to the firm, in spite of these being socially costly, and the regulator 
receives a positive contribution from the lobby. 
 
4.2 Asymmetric Information 
As before, under incomplete information the costs are privately known to the firm, while the 
regulator is assumed to have the knowledge of the distribution of the cost parameterβ . The 
probability distribution of β  is given by  ( ) Pr νβ β == . The regulator maximizes his objective 
function subject to the ICs and IRs. The ICs for the two types in this case are 
  () ()
11
11
t K dq t K dq ββ
σσ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ −−≥ −− ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ++
,     
  () ()
11
11
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σ
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⎤ ≥ ⎦ .         
As earlier, it is easy to show that the IC for the efficient type and IR for the inefficient type always 
guarantee IR for the efficient type. Further, it will be proved later that, at the political optimum, IC 
for the inefficient type will hold. Thus, the optimization program of the regulator will include the 
following two constraints only: IC for the efficient type and the IR for the inefficient type. The 
corresponding Lagrangean expression will be 
() ()( ) () {}
() () ()() () {}
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where 1 λ %  and  2 λ %  are the Lagrangean multipliers associated with the two constraints respectively. The 
first order conditions are: 
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The conditions in (39) – (44) pertain to complementarity slackness and the multipliers  1
~














in equilibrium. Solving this 
yields 12 λ νλ = %% . This relation is satisfied when either  12 0 λλ = = %%  or when  ,  , such that  1 0 λ > %








% . This implies that if both the multipliers assume a positive value, we get an interior solution, 
in which case the IC for the efficient type and the IR for the inefficient type will bind at the optimum 
(from (39) and (40)). Thus, the inefficient type’s rent will be pushed down to zero. The efficient type 
will earn a positive rent and will be able to operate positive contributions to the regulator. On the 
  24other hand, if both the multipliers assume a value of zero, conditions (39) and (40) reveal that neither 
the IC for the efficient type nor the IR for the inefficient type will bind at the optimum. In this case, 
the regulator will leave a positive rent even to the inefficient type (besides the efficient type), thus 
reaping a positive political contribution irrespective of the firm type. 
 
Note that substituting for λ %  from (29) in the right hand sides of (27) and (28), the full information 
equilibrium conditions for either firm type with lobbying will be   
  ( ) ( ) 1 Dd q λ β ′ =+ ,          ( 4 5 )  
  ,         ( 4 6 )   () ( ) ( ) 1 Vq Kd λβ ′ =+ −
which are identical to those under full information, but with no lobbying (see equations (2) and (3)).  
 
To check for the effect of asymmetry of information alone on the optimal contract, we substitute for 
1 λ %  from (37) into the right hand sides of (33) and (35). This yield 
  () ( ) 1 Dd q λ β ′ =+ ⋅ ,          ( 4 7 )  
  () () ( 1 Vq Kd λβ ′ =+ − ) .         ( 4 8 )  
The equilibrium conditions (47) and (48) are analogous to those in the case of full information (see 
equations (2) and (3) or (45) and (46) above). Hence, for the efficient type, the regulated level of 
pollution and output are not deviating from their first-best levels. This is not true in so far as the 
contract for the inefficient type is concerned, which is distorted in response to incomplete 
information about firm’s costs. To show this, we substitute for  1 λ %  and  2 λ %  from (37) and (38) in the 
right hand sides of (34) and (36) respectively. Further, using the relation 12 λ νλ = %%  (as derived earlier), 
we can express (34) and (36) as 
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+− +
,    (49) 
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++ − + + ′ =− + −
+− + ) ν β − . (50) 
When , equations (49) and (50) converge to (45) and (46) respectively, and asymmetry of 
information has no bearing on the equilibrium pollution and output levels.  However, matters are 
different when   and . It is found that,   
12 0 λλ == %%
1 0 λ > %
2 0 λ > %
 
  25Proposition 6: Optimal pollution,  ), (β d is increasing and output,  ), (β q  is decreasing in the firm 
type. That is,  and  . This result holds in both the cases, viz. when ()0 d β
⋅
> ()0 q β
⋅
< 12 0 λλ = = %% , and 
when   and .  1 0 λ > %
2 0 λ > %
 
Proof. Here also, the method of proof is similar to that for the no-lobby case (see Proposition 1) or 




Proposition 7: Even at the political equilibrium, for  1 λ %  and  2 λ %  both positive, the optimal regulation 
under asymmetric information entails an upward adjustment of the pollution and a downward one of 
the output for the inefficient firm type as compared to that under full information.  
 
Proof.  Note the parameter ν  in the right hand sides of both (45) and (49). As  , 0 → ν  equation (49) 
collapses into (45) and equation (50) into (46), or that these converge to the first-order conditions 
under full information. For  , 1 0 < <ν we have the necessary conditions at the asymmetric 
equilibrium. Thus, comparative statics with respect to parameter ν  help analyze the changes in the 
optimum pollution and output levels in moving from the full to the incomplete information 
equilibria. It is found that, for  ,   0 > ′ ′ D , 0 < ′ ′ V  and both sufficiently large in magnitude,  0 > ν d d d  
and  . 0 < ν d q d
14 Thus, asymmetry of information induces a lowering of environmental standard 
and restriction on regulated output of the inefficient firm. 
 
Intuitively, as far as pollution and output regulation is concerned, either type of firm and the 
regulator stand to gain from higher allowable pollution and lower output to the extent that firms’ 
production costs are lowered on account of both of these, and the regulator extracts higher rent from 
the efficient type. However, the efficient firm type reaps a lower rent/ surplus due to higher regulated 
pollution and lower output for the inefficient firm-type, and this is a source of loss for it. At the 
asymmetric information equilibrium, the optimal contract for the efficient type is not distorted as 
compared to the full information equilibrium (this is because its IC binds, although its IR does not), 
but there is an upward and downward distortion in the pollution and output levels of the inefficient 
                                                 
13 See Appendix E for a detailed mathematical proof of this proposition for both the cases. 
14 Appendix F contains the mathematical proof.  
  26type respectively, as the rent of the efficient type is declining in the pollution and increasing in the 
output of the inefficient firm type. 
 
Next, to capture the effect of political lobbying by the firm/ industry alone on the optimal contract, 
we compare the first-order conditions under incomplete information, but with and without lobbying 
activity. Accordingly, (47) and (48) are compared with (13) and (15) respectively, for the efficient 
firm type. As expected, it is revealed that firm politics has no effect on the optimal behavior of the 
efficient firm. For the inefficient type, the method of proof similar to the one used for Proposition 7 
is used to compare the equilibrium pollution and output levels, yielded by the solution to the 
equilibrium conditions (49) and (50) under lobbying with those obtained by solving (14) and (16) 
with no-lobbying. It is derived that,  
 
Proposition 8. For  1 λ %  and  2 λ %  positive and  , the presence of the industry lobby induces a lower 
level of optimal pollution for the inefficient type vis-à-vis the situation of no lobbying (where 
1 a >
) 1 = a . 
The equilibrium price-cost margin for the inefficient type is also lowered vis-à-vis the no lobby case, 
induced by the regulatory contract, implying a relative upward distortion in the output level. 
 
Proof.  From a comparison of equation (49) with (14) and that of (50) with (16), it is evident that as 
 the former equations collapse to the latter. Thus, comparative statics with respect to 
parameter  would provide the direction of change of equilibrium pollution and output levels in 
making a discrete move from the regulated equilibrium without lobbying to the one where firm-
lobbying happens. In view of  and 
, 1 → a
a
0 > ′ ′ D , 0 < ′ ′ V  and the absolute magnitudes of these being large 
enough, it is derived that  0 < da d d  and  . 0 > da q d
15   
 
Thus, despite being politically inclined, the regulator is induced to lower the optimal pollution and 
the price-cost margin (thus raising the regulated output) for the inefficient type as compared to the 
no-lobby case. This might seem counter-intuitive, in that, a politically inclined regulator adopts a 
more stringent environmental regulation as compared to the benevolent regulator. Intuitively, what 
happens is as follows. The regulator here is driven by two motives, namely rent extraction from the 
efficient type (which is also the motive of the benevolent regulator) as this is socially costly, and 
rent-seeking from both the firm due to his/ her political inclination. By inducing a relatively lower 
                                                 
15 A detailed proof of this is provided in Appendix G. 
  27optimal pollution and a higher output on the part of the inefficient firm as compared to the 
benchmark case, he/ she stands to incur a loss in terms of his/ her political motive, as it implies a rise 
in the production cost (entailing a lower rent and lower political contribution from the firm-lobby) as 
well as in his/ her efficiency motive as this implies that the efficient type now reaps a greater rent/ 
surplus. On the other hand, he/ she gains because the social welfare is now higher on account of 
lower pollution and higher output and partly because the efficient firm would tend to offer the 
regulator a higher political contribution (which is a fixed proportion of its rent) through greater rent 
leakage to it. These gains seemingly outweigh the indicated losses. 
 
Finally, it is proved that the optimal regulatory contract is, in fact, incentive compatible for the 
inefficient type, given the equilibrium conditions as in equations (33)-(38). We can express the IC 
for the inefficient type as  () ()
11
11
U t Kd q U Kd q ββ
σσ
⎡⎤ ≥− − = − Δ − ⎣⎦ ++
. In the case 
of , the IC for the efficient type does not bind.  Its substitution in the right hand side yields 
the condition 





Kd q Kd q β
σ
⎡ >Δ− − − ⎣ +
⎤
⎦ . 
16 This is satisfied at the optimum, as dd > , 
qq < (from Proposition 6) and both σ  and  β Δ  are positive. On the other hand, when the IC for the 
efficient type binds at the optimum (both the multipliers take positive values), substituting it with 





Kd q Kd q β
σ
⎡ ≥Δ− − − ⎣ +
⎤
⎦ . Again from Proposition 6, this is satisfied at the optimum as 
dd > , qq < , and  0 σ > ,  0 β Δ>. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The paper first characterizes the optimal regulatory contract for the monopoly firm under full 
information and asymmetric information as the benchmark case. This is subsequently extended to 
include the influence of an environmental lobby and a firm-lobby respectively. In all the three cases 
we find that, under informational constraints, both the pricing rule and the incentives for cost 
reduction (through choice of pollution abatement effort) are distorted for the inefficient or the high 
cost firm. The directions of these distortions in the contract are identified and found to be the same in 
                                                 
16 We substitute the IC for the efficient type in the form of  ()
1
1





  28the three cases considered. However, the efficient type’s contract is not affected by information 
asymmetry in all the three cases. 
 
Further, in the presence of the environmental lobby, as expected the politically inclined regulator 
imposes a more stringent environmental regulation under both full information and incomplete 
information (for both the firm-types) compared to the benchmark case when there was no lobbying 
activity. Accordingly, the extent of distortion in the allowable pollution of the inefficient type is less 
compared to the no lobby case. However, the rule governing the pricing regulation is unaffected by 
the lobbying activity of the environmental group. 
 
In the presence of the industry lobby, lobbying impacts only the optimal regulatory contract for the 
inefficient firm-type. Surprisingly, we find that there is now more stringent environmental regulation 
and a lower price-cost margin allowed to the inefficient type as compared to the first case involving 
no lobby. This result holds irrespective of whether only the efficient firm type earns a positive rent or 
when both the firm types are left with a positive rent. 
 
The analysis can be extended in a number of directions. One of them could be to introduce 
competition among the lobbies (similar to the one in Grossman and Helpman (1994)) in the context 
of an upcoming election. Obviously, in this case, both the lobbies would simultaneously try to 
influence the regulator for favorable policy outcomes. The model could also be extended to consider 
multiple firms who are either price takers or compete in prices in the commodity market, and 
competition among firm-lobbies when firms’ output is differentiated in terms of pollution intensity. 
In these alternative market situations, the optimal regulatory contract over pollution could throw up 
some significant policy implications for optimal environmental regulation.  
 
Appendices 
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1: For any β , the following pair of equations define the 
equilibrium: 




λ βλ β β
ν
′ =+ + −
−
,       
  () ( ) ( ) () ( 1
1




′ =+ − + − −
−
.       
  29Note that as β  takes the value β , the two above equations collapse to the first-order conditions (13) 















  () ( 12 ) D dq ρβ ρβ ′ =− ,             
  () () ( 12 Vq Kd ρβ ρβ ′ =− − ) .          
We differentiate these two equations with respect to β  to determine how the optimal values of   
and   change as 
d
q β  changes from β  to β . This yields the following comparative statics: 
   ()() () () 11 2 Dd d q q β ρρ β ρ β β
⋅⋅
′′ =+ − ,       
  ()() ( )() () 11 2 Vq q Kd d β ρρ β ρ β
⋅⋅
′′ =− − − β .
17      
Solving by substitution, we get the two expressions 
  ()
( )( ) ( )









⋅ ′′ ′ +− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ =
′′ ′′ ′ −+
,       
  ()
( )( ) ( )






Dd Vq q Dd
ρ
β
⋅ ′′ ′ −− ⎡⎤ ⎣ =
′′ ′′ ′ +
⎦ .        
Note that for any β  at the equilibrium, the second-order conditions require that   








⎡ ′′ ′′ 0 ⎤ + ++ −< ⎢ − ⎣⎦ ⎥ ,       
using parameterized first-order conditions at the outset, we can write 









++ − = =
−− d
. Subsequently, we get the following two conditions for 
the second-order conditions to go through  
  ,          () () ( ) () ()
2 2 0 Dd VqKd Vq ′′ ′′ ′ −+ <
() () () ( )
2 2 0 Dd Vq q Dd ′′ ′′ ′ +<
                                                
.       
 
17 Here, the notation   denotes  ) (β d & β d dd  and so on. 
  30These require the benefit function  to be sufficiently concave, or    , and both to 
be sufficiently large. These are sufficient for   and 
(.) V , 0 < ′ ′ V () 0 Dd ′′ >
()0 d β
⋅
> ()0 q β
⋅
< . The cost function,  is not 
monotonic in 
(.), C
β . Differentiating the total cost function with respect to β  yields 
  ( ) () ( ) () ( CK d q K d q q d ) β ββ β
⋅⋅
=− + − − β
⋅
.       
The first term in the right hand side is negative as  ()0 q β
⋅
< and the third term is also negative as 
. But the second term is positive, making the sign of  ()0 d β
⋅
> () C β
⋅
 indeterminate, and dependent 
on the values of K  and β . 
 
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2:  Since the move from the full information to asymmetric 
information equilibrium can be captured by the following parameterized pair of first-order 
conditions: 




λ βλ ξ β
ν
′ =+ + −
−
β  
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Comparative statics with respect to ξ  yields that 
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1
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 The solution to the above system of 
equations will be  
2
1
2 2 1 ) (
ϕ
φ φ φ
ξ + ′ ′ ′ ′
′ ′ + −
=
V D











ξ + ′ ′ ′ ′
− ′ ′ + −
=
V D




which will be unambiguously positive and negative respectively since V is assumed to be 
sufficiently negative and 
′ ′
D′ ′ sufficiently positive for the second-order conditions to be satisfied. 
 
  31Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 3: Note that amongst the three first-order conditions, it is only 
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in view of   Furthermore, totally differentiating equation (21) we get,  . 0 > ′ ′ D
. 0
) 1 (
) 1 ( ) ( >
′ ′
+ −
= ⇒ + − = ′ ′
V dd
dq
dd dq q V
β λ
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Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 4: Parameterizing the first-order conditions (given by equations 
23-26) with respect to β  in order to capture the discrete jump in it from one value to the other at the 
equilibrium and then differentiating these first-order conditions with respect to the same parameter, 
we get two similar equations in  () d β
⋅
 and  () q β
⋅
 like those in Appendix A. Solving by substitution 
yields the following 
  ()
() () ( )










⋅ ′′ ′ +− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ =
′′ ′′ ′ −+
, 
  ()
( )( ) ( )










⋅ ′′ ′ −− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ =












> . These will be positive and negative respectively, in view of  , 0 > ′ ′ D , 0 < ′ ′ V  
and both being sufficiently large in magnitude.  
 
Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 6: Part A: First consider the case where both the multipliers 
assume a zero value. The first order conditions (equations (47)-(48) for the efficient type and 
equations (49)-(50) for the inefficient type) reduce to  
  () ( ) 1 Dd q λ β ′ =+ ⋅ , 
  () () 1 D dq λ β ′ =+ ⋅ , 
  () () () 1 Vq Kd λβ ′ =+ − , 
  ( ) () ( ) 1 Vq Kd λβ ′ =+ −. 
For any β  at the equilibrium, this is fully captured by the following pair of equations 
  32  ( ) ( ) 1 Dd q λ β ′ =+ , 
  .  () ( ) ( ) 1 Vq Kd λβ ′ =+ −
Differentiation of these two equations with respect to β gives  
  ()()( ) () 1 Dd d q q β λβ β
⋅⋅ ⎡⎤ ′′ =+ + ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
, 
  ()()( ) ( ) () 1 Vq q Kd d β λβ
⋅⋅ ⎡⎤ ′′ =+ − − ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
β . 
Solving by substitution, we get  
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⋅ ′′ +− − + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ =
′′ ′′ ++
. 
Note that the denominators in the above two expressions are nothing but what was implied by the 
second-order condition of the full information equilibrium conditions under the benchmark case of 
no lobbying (section 2.1, pp 9). The sign of the denominators is, therefore, negative. Further, since, 
 and both sufficiently large in magnitude, all these conditions are sufficient for 
 and 
, 0 > ′ ′ D , 0 < ′ ′ V
()0 d β
⋅
> ()0 q β
⋅
< .  
Part B: Now consider the case of positive multipliers where both the IC for the good type and the IR 
for the bad type bind at the optimum. The first-order conditions in (47)-(48) for the efficient firm 
type (that is,  β β = ) and (49)-(50)  for the inefficient firm type (that is,  β β = ) could be captured by 
the following pair of equations: 
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> , and 
2











  () () 12 D dq γ βγ β ′ =− , 
  33  () () () 12 Vq Kd γβ γβ ′ =− − . 
Comparative statics with respect to β  yield 
  ()() () () 11 2 Dd d q q β γγ β γ β β
⋅⋅
′′ =+ − , 
  ()() ( )() () 11 2 Vq q Kd d β γγ β γ β
⋅⋅
′′ =− − − β . 
The solution will be given by expressions similar to those obtained in Appendix A 
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′′ ′′ ′ +
. 
The signs are in view of the same regularity conditions that we have used in proving other 
propositions i.e. V is sufficiently negative and  ′ ′ D′ ′ sufficiently positive. 
 
Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 7: Differentiating equations (49) and (50) with respect to 
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These simply yield the following system of equations: 
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in view of  , 0 > ′ ′ D , 0 < ′ ′ V  and both sufficiently large in magnitude, and both  1 α and  2 α  positive. 
 
Appendix G: Proof of Proposition 8: This time, differentiating (49) and (50) with respect to 
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This can be expressed as the following system of equations: 
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since   and both sufficiently large in magnitude, as well as  , 0 > ′ ′ D , 0 < ′ ′ V 1 δ is positive and  2 δ  
negative in sign. 
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